> Hypothetically, if the U.S. wanted to carry out a naval landing in Iran, they would do it somewhere outside the Persian Gulf, most likely Chabahar or somewhere else in the flat open coasts of Sistan-Balochistan Province.
> They could bring their ships close enough to the shore with relative safety, under heavy air cover. U.S. jets, drones, and attack helicopters would suppress any coastal anti-ship batteries heavily, and create sufficiently safe conditions for the initial ‘landing’.
> This might be coupled with increased Balochi terrorist activity across the Iranian rear lines, creating chaos, complicating defenses, logistics, and the transfer of equipment and reinforcements to confront the invasion force. One also cannot rule out the possibility of deploying U.S. airborne forces, to secure key sites before a landing is attempted.
> In Sistan-Balochistan, Iranian ballistic missile platforms, MLRS systems, and armored formations capable of confronting the invading force are also fairly limited in quantity. The initial phase of resistance would focus mainly on assymetric warfare; small squads of Iranian ATGM crews, FPV drone operators, IEDs, drones, and what little precision-guides artillery & air support (UAVs) could be scrambled.
> However, in my assessment, time will tell a different story. The longer the American force remains on the Iranian shores, the harsher their conditions will deteriorate. The Iranians will reorganize, MANPAD squads and remaininf SHORAD systems will likely form too much of a risk for U.S. aviation to provide effective long-term air cover, local civilians would resist occupation with guerilla tactics, and Iran would have moved sufficient amounts of MLRS, missile, and artillery systems to the area to make any sustained American presence a nightmare.
> I believe the U.S. is currently not willing to tolerate the sheer amounts of losses such an operation would entail. The public is already very opposed to the war, and this opposition would increase 10x. Dozens, if not hundreds, of American soldiers would die within the first month of such an operation, possibly thousands after several months. And what’s the strategic goal here? What purpose does it serve?
> The answer is: None. A limited amphibious landing would not bring any benefit to the United States, unless they go all-out. That would entail deploying tens of thousands of troops and securing the entire southern coastline towards the Strait of Hormuz, in an effort to stop the disruption of shipping & bring Iran back to the table.
> Realistically? Impossible. The disasters such an operation would bring to the region are unimaginable, and senior U.S. military officials will *hopefully* realize it is a non-starter, before they ever embark on this campaign.
> Iran would treat such a scenario as total war. A divine war, magnitudes greater than the 8-year long Iran-Iraq war. All red lines would have been finally crossed. And in such a case, the IRGC Aerospace Force will take the entire region down with it. All economic, military and civilian infrastructure in the Gulf will cease to exist. Millions would be mobilized, and it will be a bloodbath on both sides.
Interesting take by MES. I felt the Chabahar area was a likely landing spot back when this first began (in '26, I mean).